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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FOCUS ON LATIN AMERICA: IS IT ADEQUATE?

by

Colonel Sharon R. Hamilton
United States Army

Colonel Alex Crowther
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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ABSTRACT

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Historically, Latin America has been an economy of force region for United States. This is especially true when apportioning strategic intelligence resources. This study reviews and analyzes the allocation of national intelligence resources and priorities for Latin America. The current national security architecture including the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the National Military Strategy (NMS) define our national interests in the Western Hemisphere. To determine the adequacy of national intelligence allocation to Latin America it is necessary to review the process of translating the current national strategies into Latin American focused National Intelligence Priorities. This study analyzes three current and projected Latin American threats that potentially impact the security and national interests of the United States: failed states, ungoverned spaces, and transnational threats. Adequate and comprehensive strategic intelligence focus on Latin America is critical to the current and future US national security. The study concludes with policy recommendations to address intelligence efficiency and resource allocation with the relative importance of Latin America to the United States.

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FOCUS ON LATIN AMERICA: IS IT ADEQUATE?

Historically, Latin America has been an economy of force region for United States. This has been especially true when apportioning strategic intelligence resources. Some would argue that the last time the U.S. government committed to a specific Latin American strategy was during the Reagan Administration in the 1980s, “when defeating the Soviet Union and halting its advances in Central America were part of a comprehensive effort to win the Cold War”¹. In early 2001, the administration of George W. Bush made advances in Latin America free trade agreements and promised a “Century of the Americas”. This Latin America focus was fundamentally changed when the events of 11 September 2001 occurred. After 9/11, the United States national strategy and policy shifted to a focus on the fight against terrorism. Since we are a country at war, the recent national strategies strongly reflect our focus on the security of the American people. To ensure that an environment of security is maintained, the U.S. must continue to look beyond its borders and project the promotion of our democratic values and support to economic prosperity to all regions, to include Latin America. Many democracies in Latin America are relatively young and vulnerable to a variety of challenges, including influence from many internal and external sources. The strength of the democracies throughout Latin America is endangered by limited economic growth and weak governmental institutions. If our national intelligence resources ignore or neglect the Latin American region it reduces our ability to monitor potential threats to the fragile democracies, monitor support to extremist groups, and increased insurgent activity in this vital region. But what constitutes “adequate” intelligence coverage of our national interests in Latin America? “Adequate” is defined as enough intelligence support for what is required and that it is sufficient and suitable for our Nation’s needs.

In order to determine what the intelligence requirements are, this paper discusses the types of intelligence available, the structure of national intelligence and US national strategies for the Western Hemisphere. Based on information derived from the national strategies and interviews with intelligence professionals from several national agencies, a list of threats present in Latin America is developed. The paper will conclude with an assessment of the adequacy of Latin America intelligence coverage and policy recommendations to balance intelligence allocation with Latin American threats. The four recommendations provided at the end of this paper support improved resource and training efficiencies, balanced intelligence resource allocation, and strengthened security cooperation relationships throughout the region. The recommendations are derived from the research conducted and referenced in this paper,

interviews conducted with national intelligence professionals, and objectives contained in the 2006 National Intelligence Strategy (NIS).

US National Intelligence

Intelligence Disciplines

There are seven major disciplines of intelligence: imagery intelligence (IMINT); human intelligence (HUMINT); signals intelligence (SIGINT); measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT); open source intelligence (OSINT); technical intelligence (TECHINT); and counterintelligence (CI). These single source intelligence disciplines are fused to produce the all-source intelligence required to answer the requirements of national-level consumers (Figure 1). According to Latin American analysts in several national intelligence agencies, the primary sources of intelligence on Latin America are derived from human intelligence, signals intelligence and open source intelligence.

Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is the collection of foreign information by a trained collector from people and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, personnel, and capabilities. HUMINT uses human sources as a tool, and a variety of collection methods, both passively and actively, to collect information². Most of this collection is performed by overt collectors such as diplomats and military attaches, obtained through debriefing of foreign nationals and US citizens who travel abroad and official contacts with foreign governments. The CIA and the Defense HUMINT Service, an element of the Defense Intelligence Agency, are the primary collectors of HUMINT for the Intelligence Community (IC).

Signals Intelligence is technical and intelligence information derived from the exploitation of foreign electronic emissions which is comprised either individually or in combination of communications intelligence (COMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT). Within the intelligence community, the National Security Agency is overall responsible for SIGINT.

Intelligence Disciplines




Figure 1. Intelligence Disciplines

The use and presence of SIGINT in Latin America is limited due to geographic and environmental factors. The US military withdrawal from Panama in 1999 and the associated removal of SIGINT ground sites in that region resulted in reduced SIGINT collection in Latin America.

Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) is publicly available information appearing in print or electronic form including radio, television, newspapers, journals, the Internet, commercial databases, and videos, graphics, and drawings. Open-source collection responsibilities are broadly distributed through the IC, but the major collectors are the DNI's Open Source Center (OSC) and the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC). The DNI's Open Source Center (OSC) collects open source information for U.S. Government use. On 8 November 2005, DNI John D. Negroponte announced the creation of the DNI Open Source Center (OSC), effective 1 November 2005. The OSC is based at CIA and is built around what was formerly the CIA's Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). Historically, the challenge with OSINT is the perception and practice among intelligence analysts to "discount information not marked classified or Secret"³.

The blending and synthesis of these single source intelligence disciplines are used to develop all-source intelligence. All-source intelligence incorporates intelligence products,

organizations, and activities from all sources of information and intelligence, including open-source information, in the production of intelligence. All-source intelligence, while not a separate intelligence discipline, is the critical product developed by analysts from multiple intelligence or information sources. It is possible for an adversary to deceive intelligence collectors reliant upon one source, such as imagery intelligence or human intelligence. Therefore, the value of all-source intelligence is the reduction of one single source reliance and vulnerability to deceptive practices. When you combine several intelligence sources, the all-source analysis either verifies or refutes single source data.

National Intelligence Structure

The seven intelligence disciplines are managed, collected and produced by the National Intelligence Community (IC). As a result of the attacks on 11 September 2001 and the subsequent 9/11 Commission, the IC is undergoing a wide reaching transformation. In April 2005, the Office of the Director, National Intelligence (DNI) was established to coordinate the United States Intelligence Community (IC). The intelligence community consists of 16 agencies and approximately 100,000 personnel (Figure 2).

Intelligence Community




Figure 2. Intelligence Community

Under the direction of the Director National Intelligence, each agency possesses different assets (collection and/or analysis) and supports different customers. These organizations

support national decision makers and joint force commanders. However, “the focus of these national organizations is not evenly split among intelligence customers and varies according to the situation and competing requirements”⁴. Also at the strategic level, the National Security Council structure contains a Western Hemisphere section to focus on Latin America issues and to coordinate priorities for national attention.

Created in 1979 to facilitate intelligence coordination, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) provides analyses of foreign policy issues that have been reviewed and coordinated throughout the Intelligence Community. As a result of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), the NIC now reports directly to the DNI and provides the President and senior policymakers with detailed, coordinated intelligence analyses for use in policy formulation. The NIC is composed of National Intelligence officers who are senior experts drawn from all agencies of the intelligence community and from outside the Government. National Intelligence officers concentrate on “the substantive problems of particular geographic regions of the world and of particular functional areas such as economics and weapons proliferation”⁵. National intelligence officers lead the intelligence community’s effort to produce National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and other NIC products. The NIC assists the Intelligence Community by evaluating the adequacy of intelligence support and works with the community’s functional managers to refine strategies to meet the most priority requirements of senior consumers and decision-makers.

All 16 members of the national intelligence community conduct some level of intelligence collection, analysis or production operations focused on Latin America. This research report focuses on two national intelligence agencies: the Defense Intelligence Agency and the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). In addition, the Army’s National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) provides key Latin American intelligence products in support of theater and national requirements. Representatives of each of these organizations provided input to this research project.

The mission of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is to provide intelligence on foreign armed forces, weapons systems, and military strategies. The DIA supports operations to include military intelligence, counterterrorism, counter-narcotics, medical intelligence, Weapons of Mass Destruction and proliferation, and UN peacekeeping and multinational support⁶. DIA is responsible for managing National all-source production efforts of the intelligence organizations of the four military services. In April 2006, the DIA established the Defense Joint Intelligence Operations Center (DJIOC) to increase collaboration and synchronization of scarce intelligence resources. The DJIOC mission is to “...plan, prepare, integrate, direct, synchronize, and

manage continuous, full-spectrum Defense Intelligence Operations in support of the Combatant Commanders (COCOMs)...collaborative, interactive relationship with the ODNI, national intelligence agencies and centers, Combatant Command JIOCs, Combat Support Agencies, Service intelligence organizations, and JFCC-ISR, to create a system-of-systems JIOC enterprise network enabled by enterprise Information technology architecture”⁷. The DIA has oversight of all Department of Defense Intelligence production under which all-source intelligence is produced for use by policymakers and commanders.

The mission of the State Department INR is to analyze foreign intelligence drawn from diplomatic missions abroad, open sources, U.S. and foreign scholars and other sources. The INR produces intelligence studies and current intelligence analysis essential to foreign policy determination and execution. INR analysts come from both the Foreign Service, with extensive in-country experience, and government civilians. The INR is structured to analyze regional and functional threats. Through training and experience, INR analysts possess strong regional and functional backgrounds that “allow them to respond rapidly to changing policy priorities and to provide early warning and in-depth analysis of events and trends that affect US foreign policy and national security interests”⁸.

The third agency that provides strategic intelligence coverage on Latin America is the Army’s National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC). The NGIC, subordinate to the Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), is the Army’s production center and provides ground intelligence to U.S. Government agencies and decision makers. It produces all-source scientific, technical, and general military intelligence on foreign ground forces capabilities and systems. This intelligence supports customers at all echelons to include combatant commanders theater joint intelligence operations centers (JIOCs) with a wide range of futures-oriented threat assessments. In response to accelerated operations tempo caused by the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the NGIC stood up a 24-hour operations center to provide responsive, actionable intelligence support. This expanded capability can be used to respond to all future crises. In support of civilian and military customers, the NGIC produces detailed assessments of future threats, tactical and operational capabilities, conflict scenarios, and forecast regions of future conflict.

The DIA, State INR, and NGIC each possess both unique and overlapping intelligence priorities, requirements, and capabilities. These agencies base their regional and functional priorities on national security priorities, agency specific missions, and the dynamic global diplomatic, military and economic environment. The presence of both redundant and unique intelligence collection, analysis and production provides the national decision makers access to

collaborative and competing analytical views that are essential for policy formulation and situational awareness.

US National Security and the Western Hemisphere

To determine the adequacy of national intelligence allocation to Latin America the first step is a comparative review of current United States national strategies to identify our national interests and priorities in the Latin American region. This section examines four national strategies: the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, the National Military Strategy, and the National Intelligence Strategy. This section also contains a short discussion on the United States' participation in and the influence of the Organization of American States (OAS).

The basis of United States policies towards Latin America Support is support to freedom and democracy. The 2006 National Security Strategy states "It is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture..."⁹. The NSS states that "democracies are the most responsible members of the international system, promoting democracy is the most effective long-term measure for strengthening international stability; reducing regional conflicts; countering terrorism and terror-supporting extremism; and extending peace and prosperity"¹⁰. Our National Security Strategy is based on the belief that the Western Hemisphere is the "frontline of defense of American national security". American security is directly linked to the security and stability of our nearest "neighbors". The National Security Strategy for the Western Hemisphere seeks to¹¹:

solidify strategic relationships with regional leaders in Central and South America and the Caribbean who are deepening their commitment to democratic values...to work with regional partners to make multilateral institutions like the OAS and the Inter-American Development Bank more effective and better able to foster concerted action to address threats that may arise to the region's stability, security, prosperity, or democratic progress...these partnerships can advance our four strategic priorities for the region: bolstering security, strengthening democratic institutions, promoting prosperity, and investing in people.

The 2006 NSS identifies an ongoing concern for the Latin America counter-narcotics effort, but the overall strategy focus is on regional security. Three Latin American regional challenges are highlighted in the 2006 NSS¹²:

- Colombia's ongoing fight against Marxist terrorists and drug-traffickers.
- Venezuela as a demagogue awash in oil money is undermining democracy and seeking to destabilize the region.

- Cuba's anti-American dictator who oppresses the Cuban people and seeks to subvert freedom in the region.

The NSS also presents a powerful case that weak or repressive governments are not as capable of dealing with these regional challenges as an effective democracy.

The 2006 NSS also stresses commitment to establish democracy "charters" in regions that lack them. The United States participates and supports the promotion of democracy in Latin America through established multinational alliances and organizations, such as the Organization of the American States (OAS). The United States works with the OAS to extend and strengthen democracy and to support democratic institutions. The United States' active participation in the OAS provides a valuable international venue for supporting political objectives. Since the 1969 OAS American Convention on Human Rights, the OAS has provided the system for pursuing human rights and principles of governing in Latin America. In 1991, the OAS established the "representative democracy as an indispensable condition for the stability, peace, and development of the region"¹³.

The OAS also adopted the Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC) on September 11, 2001 to maintain, support, strengthen and defend democracy. The IADC defines the elements and obligations of democracy and how it should be defended and promoted. The IADC provides "the governments of the Western Hemisphere a framework to guide their collective action when democracy faces challenges"¹⁴. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell told the OAS General Assembly on June 9, 2003: "The Inter-American Democratic Charter...is the purest expression of our common conviction that democracy is the only legitimate form of government and that our people deserve nothing less."¹⁵ These charters define and promote functioning democracies that are expected to be capable of handling disputes and challenges internally and externally in an acceptable manner.

National Defense Strategy 2005

The March 2005 National Defense Strategy (NDS) is developed based on the National Security Strategy and it outlines the plan to defend the United States and its interests as detailed in the National Security Strategy. The NDS focuses on proactively influencing events before they become "unmanageable". The 2005 NDS contains key objectives that directly impact Latin American strategic engagement and intelligence priorities. The first operational capability contained in the NDS that impacts Latin America is the need to strengthen intelligence to reduce vulnerabilities. The three priorities to strengthen intelligence listed in the NDS should directly impact our Latin America intelligence policy. The first priority is the necessity for early

warning of “imminent crises” such as instability in Latin American countries. The second priority is to deliver exacting intelligence. The need to “improve support to intelligence consumers...to increase our capabilities for collection”¹⁶ is essential. Third, horizontal integration within the intelligence community and the ability to “fuse operations and intelligence...will enable us to better acquire, assess, and deliver critical intelligence both to senior decision-makers and war fighters”¹⁷.

Another identified NDS operational capability focus that should impact the Latin American intelligence priorities is the effort to deny sanctuary to enemies.

Adversaries who threaten the United States and its interests require secure bases. They will use great distance or sanctuary created by ungoverned territory to their advantage...to deny sanctuary requires a number of capabilities, including: persistent surveillance...and stability operations to assist in the establishment of effective and responsible control over ungoverned territory¹⁸.

Irregular challenges provide a uniquely difficult problem set for intelligence support to Latin America. To be successful, the intelligence community must possess “the capabilities to identify, locate, track, and engage individual enemies and their networks. Doing so will require greater capabilities across a range of areas, particularly intelligence, surveillance and communications”¹⁹. To meet the requirements identified in the NDS, U.S. military forces must also have the ability to conduct lesser contingency missions in Latin America. An ongoing, reliable level of strategic intelligence collection and tracking is necessary to determine the “degree and nature of involvement in lesser contingencies to properly balance force management and operational risks”²⁰.

National Military Strategy 2004

The 2004 National Military Strategy (NMS) is developed by the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide strategic direction to the United States Armed Forces. The first priority of the 2004 NMS is to win the War on Terrorism and this means that “our nation must support the effort against transnational terrorist networks, sever their connections with state sponsors, eliminate their bases of operation...and establish a global anti-terrorism environment”²¹. While not always well publicized or readily apparent, terrorist sympathizers and financial supporters reside in several countries in Latin America. Based on this activity, the global anti-terrorism environment described in the 2004 NMS should focus on our intelligence effort to defeat terrorists through support of “national and partner nation efforts to deny state sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorist organizations...work to deny terrorists safe haven in failed states and ungoverned regions”²². The importance of military-to-military engagement and

robust intelligence partnerships in Latin America cannot be ignored or neglected. The long standing Latin American struggle to professionalize the military forces while simultaneously reducing their political power re-enforces the need for military-to-military engagements with the U.S. These partnerships, as highlighted in the 2004 NMS also “take advantage of foreign expertise and areas of focus and provide access to previously denied areas”²³.

National Intelligence Strategy 2005

The October 2005 National Intelligence Strategy (NIS) details the intelligence community’s values, priorities, future orientation and action plan. The intelligence mission objectives strive to “provide accurate and timely intelligence...support objectives drawn from the National Security Strategy”²⁴. While not regionally focused like the NSS, the NIS provides guidance relevant for Latin American focus through the strategic objectives to “Bolster the growth of democracy and sustain peaceful democratic states... Anticipate developments of strategic concern and identify opportunities as well as vulnerabilities for decision-makers”²⁵. The intelligence enterprise objectives are “To transform our capabilities faster than threats emerge, protect what needs to be protected and perform our duties according to the law”²⁶.

Latin American Threats

This review of the State Department policy, and the National Security, National Defense, National Military and National Intelligence Strategies reveal several intelligence focus areas and threats in Latin America. The Latin American threats that impact the security of the United States are transnational threats, failed, failing or unstable regimes and ungoverned space. All three of these threats can potentially provide support to global terrorism, violent extremist movements, narcotics trafficking, and increased, potentially violent, resource competition. These threats are of great concern to United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), the combatant command that represents our forward defense in the Western Hemisphere. The SOUTHCOM mission is “to protect the southern approaches to the United States and to enhance hemispheric stability and security”²⁷ against challenges such as illicit trafficking and narco-terrorism.

The transnational threats identified in Latin America include the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) in Colombia, narco-traffickers in Bolivia and elements of Hizballah, Hamas, and Egyptian Islamic Gama’at. The alleged support of terrorists groups by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez serves to embolden his efforts to undermine stability and security in the Andean Ridge region. The SOUTHCOM Commander SOUTHCOM is acutely concerned about the presence of transnational threats in the Latin America:

...indications of Islamic Radical group presence (such as Hizballah, Hamas, and Egyptian Islamic Gama'at) in various locations throughout the AOR. These members and facilitators primarily provide financial and logistical support to Islamic terrorist groups from numerous cities in the region, including the Tri-border area of Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina...enclaves in the region generally remain a refuge for terrorist support and fundraising activities. History has taught us that terrorist organizations such as al-Qaida seek safe havens in the many ungoverned areas in this region. We remained concerned that members and associates in the region could move beyond logistical support and actually facilitate terrorist training camps or operations²⁸.

Failed or unstable regimes present a real threat in Latin America. Stable democratic governments share several characteristics: an independent legislature, an impartial judicial branch, and the ability to control their national borders and internal territory. A stable democratic state provides security to its citizens, maintains institutions that promote democratic debate, develops economic security and limits levels of corruption²⁹. Conversely, failing or failed states demonstrate elements of internal chaos, loss of legitimacy, economic insufficiency, inadequate security for its citizens and enduring violence. These dynamics are difficult to contain within a state's borders and threaten to spread to surrounding states. A few Latin America states that exhibit the characteristics of "failing" or weak states include Ecuador, Bolivia and Haiti³⁰. The June 2004 National Intelligence Council (NIC) produced a paper that discussed Latin American trends through 2020. The NIC concluded that³¹:

Latin American democracies have shown growing differences with the longest-running democracies of North America and Europe. The political institutions, the rule of law and the level of accountability fail to work effectively and meet citizens' expectations... new forms of political crises are likely to appear in the years ahead to include weakness of political parties, the emergence of charismatic leaders, and the mounting influence of societies' "de facto powers" (*los poderes fácticos*, including elites, media, business groups, military, criminal organizations, etc.) in electoral contests.

Ungoverned space is "Territory lacking effective, organized, and/or responsible governance, affording secure sanctuary for illicit criminal organizations, terrorist network(s), and/or anti-government paramilitaries...Includes under-governed areas within a country with a functioning government. Government may be witting or unwitting"³². Ungoverned space presents a regional security threat concern because it is a key resource used by terrorists as a safe haven. According to the U.S House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), the "failure of government to police its own territory can often provide nurturing environments for terrorist groups, and for insurgents and criminals. The failure of governments to control their own territory creates potential power vacuums that open opportunities for those who hate"³³ In the case of Latin America, there are two regions considered ungoverned or under-governed:

The Tri-Border area where Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina intersect and FARC controlled regions in Colombia. The SOUTHCOM Commander calls attention to the unconventional, “insidious nature of the threats to the U.S. and our partner nations can be somewhat deceiving at first glance...and the lack of security, stability...under-governed sovereign territory and porous borders”³⁴ all of which lead to increased opportunities for extremist groups to operate and proliferate in specific Latin American regions.

The NIC also addressed the future threat of ungoverned areas to regional security. The exploitation of ungoverned areas by narco-traffickers, criminal organizations and transnational terrorists groups could:

begin to provide the mechanisms to militarily confront the armed conflicts within national borders...the effects of which are already appearing and could increase in the coming years, the nexus between domestic governance and international insecurity of the region will escalate. Areas without states’ full control (the departments of Boyacá, Caquetá and several others in Colombia; the Venezuelan-Brazilian and Venezuelan-Colombian borders; areas of Cochabamba in Bolivia; the coasts of Haiti, etc.) will be prime areas for this type of alliance³⁵.

A fourth potential threat to regional stability not specifically addressed in the national strategies but of key concern to the Commander, SOUTHCOM is the leftist, neopopulist resurgence in several Latin American countries since 2005. The results of the 2006 elections in Ecuador and Nicaragua as well as the re-election of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela pose a concern to regional stability. The potential for problems focuses on the “opportunity for those with extremist views to exploit themes of nationalism, patriotism, and anti-elite or anti-establishment rhetoric to win popular support for – especially in young and vulnerable democracies”³⁶. The simultaneous emergence of politically organized indigenous groups also threatens to destabilize Latin American governments.

National Intelligence Resources Support to Latin America

In June 2004, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) produced a discussion paper that provided Latin American trends through 2020. The 2004 NIC study predicts that “In the years ahead, Latin America’s agenda with the United States will compete more than ever against that country’s own global agenda (including anti-terrorism and the emergence of other regions of worldwide importance), placing Latin America on the back burner of Washington’s priority list...And while border conflicts will persist, large scale armed conflict in Latin America is unlikely”³⁷. This localized, moderate level of violence will result in a continued economy of force approach to the region by national policymakers.

Since the priority after 9/11 is understandably to the Middle East, intelligence agencies with oversight on Latin American issues have operated in an environment of increasingly constrained resources. The requirement to do the same or expanded operational mission in Latin America with fewer intelligence assets requires national intelligence agencies to develop ways to improve current intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.

State INR

The State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) Latin American section consists of four analysts and one analyst supervisor. The State INR Latin American analyst allocation has not changed as a result of 9/11. James McEleveen, INR senior analyst for the Latin America, was confident that adequate political and diplomatic resources were present throughout the Latin American region to meet the regional challenges presented in the 2006 NSS and 2005 NIS. In particular, Mr. McEleveen stated that the Colombian fight against Marxist terrorists and drug traffickers received sufficient collection and analysis³⁸. The top three intelligence priorities for INR are Venezuela, Cuba, and Mexico. The INR focus on Venezuela is directly linked to the National Security Strategy and the subsequent policy statements made by President Bush reference Hugo Chavez. The growing concern about Hugo Chavez' desire and ability to undermine democracies in Latin America dominates INR Latin American analysis and reporting. An unexpected consequence of the threat posed by Chavez is the increased reporting that State INR has received from sources in countries which border Venezuela and share concerns on Chavez' influence on their governments. In conjunction with the Venezuelan threat, there is ongoing concern about the stability of Cuba after Fidel Castro's death. The INR analysts assess that Raúl Castro is already running the government and that he will cooperate with Hugo Chavez' efforts to destabilize democracies in the region.

The State INR functional threat that receives the most intelligence assets and analytical focus is regime instability and unstable democracies. They consider the rise of populist elected leaders to be a major concern. In particular, the recent elections of Tabaré Vázquez in Uruguay and Michelle Bachelet in Chile are receiving analytical scrutiny. The INR considers Ecuador, Bolivia, and Haiti are unstable democracies at risk for failing or causing a migrant overflow past their borders to escape worsening environments.

Mr. McEleveen would not define any regions in Latin America as "ungoverned". He emphasized that both the Tri-border region and the Colombian border with Venezuela are governed by weak government institutions. These ungoverned or under-governed areas provide an ideal sanctuary for terrorists or terrorist sympathizers. The NSS identifies support to

global terrorism as a priority for intelligence resources. While State INR tracks the presence of Hizballah and Islamic communities in the region, they do not assess them as a direct link to a terrorist threat. The 2005 NIS identifies the intelligence mission objectives to deny terrorists operational haven or sanctuary. McEleveen stated that he believed that potential terrorists in Latin America would reside in the open, in populated areas rather than some of the remote regions. In particular, he identified Sao Paulo, Brazil and the ongoing movements of undocumented people into Venezuela as a priority concern and destabilizing factor in the region³⁹.

INR analysts are very confident they provide sufficient intelligence analysis and threat warning to policymakers. In the past several years, INR has used increasing amounts of open source intelligence (OSINT) to support its all-source products. INR reliance on OSINT increased as embassy cable reporting, previously the number one source of intelligence from in-country sources, decreased. This decrease in State cable reporting resulted from an increasing use of point to point email that is not as widely distributed as the cables. State INR analysts participate in NIC meetings along with J2 and DIA analysts when coordinated intelligence community analysis is required.

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

The top three Latin American intelligence priorities for the DIA are Venezuela, Cuba and Brazil. The increasing power and influence of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela and the Andean Ridge region are viewed as an intelligence community problem but not a vital security concern. In Cuba, the declining health of Fidel Castro and the power transition to Raúl Castro is monitored closely. Senior Intelligence Officer for the Joint Intelligence Analysis Office, Dr. David Lessard, does not expect a significant change in the Cuban political system after Fidel's death⁴⁰. After Fidel's death, an increased flow of migrants from Cuba to the US is expected. The larger concern identified by Dr. Lessard is the movement of the Cuban exile community from the US (predominantly Florida) to Cuba. The US government's potential inability to maintain control of the Cuban-American dissident movement to Cuba or the actions they may take in Cuba after Fidel's death is a looming concern.

Of the threats identified in the NSS 2006, senior DIA analysts agreed that the majority of intelligence resources are devoted to dismantling counter-narcotics organizations⁴¹. Colombia continues to receive a high level of effort and is viewed as a "good news" story as the Colombian's national security plan gains strength. In 2007, both the Colombian paramilitary organization (AUC) and the terrorist organization (ELN) are expected to be dismantled.

Conversely, the rise in Bolivian and Ecuadorian narcotics trafficking strains DIA's limited intelligence resources.

The DIA is undergoing organizational changes as a result of the overall intelligence community restructure. The DIA Joint Intelligence Analysis Center is charged to analyze and report both current issues and develop strategic assessments. To accomplish this, the JIAC analysts must coordinate and collaborate more than in previous times. One of the biggest challenges to the DIA Latin American intelligence analysts is the lack of sufficient analyst billets and the lack of regional expertise to adequately cover all production requirements⁴². The depth of intelligence analyst experience and regional experience has decreased in the past several years.

The senior DIA analysts, Lessard and Copeland, believe that technical intelligence sources such as SIGINT assets are nice to have but not critical in Latin America. Their preference is for HUMINT assets. They consider HUMINT a "blessing" and have always considered HUMINT the primary source of intelligence in this region. HUMINT is critical in determining the intentions of leaders throughout the region. If the mission in Latin America were focused on large military formations and threats, then HUMINT would not be preferable. The DIA analysts stated that they "lack strategic look capability" and are more dependent on academia than they would prefer⁴³. The quality of the academic sources and intelligentsia are considered "stale" and out of touch with the populace of the countries they are responsible for.

The good news is the improved access to open source intelligence (OSINT) and increased participation in conferences that the State Department hosts on critical countries and topics. The recent change that enabled DIA intelligence analysts to access the Internet from their workspaces revolutionized their ability to access more and varied sources. What concerns Dr. Lessard and other DIA analysts is the polarization between open sources and sensitive HUMINT sources. The lack of additional intelligence assets in the region to complete the all-source picture may increase the risk of inaccurate or incomplete analysis.

Army G-2 (DAMI)

At the Army G-2 level, Latin American issues are rarely briefed or requested. A senior G-2 intelligence professional with supervisory oversight over DAMI resources admitted that he "didn't know much about that region". Several senior Latin American intelligence analysts lamented that the G-2 has provided no guidance on Latin American regional intelligence priorities or focus. Yet, throughout the DAMI organization, intelligence analysts agreed that the top three intelligence priorities for Latin America are: Venezuela, Colombia, and Cuba.

Venezuela's ties with rogue regimes, to include Iran, are an increasing concern. The focus in Colombia is force protection for the US troops. The threat of a mass Cuban refugee migration after Fidel Castro's death is an ongoing concern but one that DAMI analysts feel they have sufficiently covered.

The economy of scale effort given to DAMI Latin American resource allocation or analytical coverage results in a lack of flexibility to respond in time of regional crisis. The only DAMI human intelligence assets located in Latin America are 22 HUMINT/Force protection personnel supporting the counter-drug mission. Joe Parker, Director, Army HUMINT Operations Center, concedes that the Latin America intelligence support will "lose more assets" in the future and that they will be even more reliant upon cooperative efforts of the countries in the region⁴⁴. There will be no increased intelligence focus on Latin America unless there is a direct link to a national priority like narco-trafficking or a particular issue that becomes important to US citizens. Resources previously allocated to counter-narcotics now work Iraq or Afghanistan issues. Mr. Parker believes there is an increased level of risk as the number of intelligence assets decreases. This loss in surge capability may impact the US ability to re-focus collection resources after Fidel Castro's death. James Bonnes, Deputy Director of the Counter-Intelligence (CI)/Human Intelligence (HUMINT)/Security Directorate, Army G-2 felt that collection capability in Latin America was "red-lined" and that the organization was taking a considerable risk in flexibility to respond to regional crises.⁴⁵

Several senior DAMI Latin American analysts believe we are accepting the most risk in the ungoverned areas where the level of corruption is high and drug traffickers operate unimpeded. The Tri-border region houses a Lebanese community that is known to provide fundraising and counterfeit documents, to include visas, to Shia elements in the region. The link between these Shia elements and Iranian operatives is a growing concern, but currently it is assessed that these communities are sympathizers but not organizers. The analysts voiced their frustration that there is no consistent intelligence coverage of this potential threat. The focus on the Islamic groups in Latin America requires precious resources but the analysts felt the need to look more at the money trail for possible Al-Queda links. Currently, the Intelligence community is reliant upon Paraguay and Brazil to provide information on Tri-border activities. The two countries where G-2 analysts felt we are accepting the most risk are Peru and Bolivia. These are source countries for coca. The counter-narcotics analysts believe that there is an increased opportunity for coca growth resurgence since our resources and national priorities are focused elsewhere and our government is no longer pressuring those country elites to aggressively fight the narco-traffickers. The counter-narcotics analysts believe they need more

operational assets and strategic focus to sufficiently cover the regional challenges highlighted in NSS 2006. The G-2 analysts understand the national intelligence requirements system very well and continue to work within the system for support on Latin American issues.

National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC)

The NGIC Latin American section is composed of five analysts focused on regional areas: Andean Ridge, Southern Cone, North America (Mexico and Canada), Central America and the Caribbean. These analysts are shifted to different regions based on changing intelligence requirements and priorities. Since 11 September 2001, three analysts formerly focused on Latin America are now tasked to cover Iraq issues. This 38% decrease in analyst strength directly impacted the amount of analytical focus on the Colombian terrorist organization, FARC. This difference was subsequently covered by Southern Command Colombia analysts (36 people total in the SOUTHCOM J2 Colombia Division). The amount of information that NGIC Latin America analysts receive is the same since 9/11 so the analysts have learned to take advantage of available tools and databases to process requirements⁴⁶. In addition, NGIC now requires consumers to provide more focused requirement requests. The NGIC analysts suffer the impact of the reduced embassy cable traffic referenced previously. They rely on Special Operations reporting and greatly value the personal connections and extensive experience of those sources. The NGIC analysts have used OSINT extensively for the past ten years and welcome the presence of online access and shared databases. The analysts prefer access to varied reporting and distinct sources to use in their analysis. The more sources used to produce an intelligence product, the more confident they are in arriving at an accurate conclusion.

The top three NGIC intelligence priorities in Latin America are Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador. While Mr. Anderson maintains Cuba is always a concern and “remains on the back burner all the time” it is not an immediate concern or threat. The continued “Cold War environment” in Cuba makes the analysts reliant on more technical than human intelligence. The lack of “inside” information makes it very difficult to determine the intentions of Cuban leadership. The first NGIC analytical priority is Colombia and the ongoing support to counter narco-terrorists and drug trafficking. While the most Latin American intelligence resources are focused on the Colombian conflict Mr. Anderson felt he never had “adequate” information to provide a clear assessment. The second analytical priority is Venezuela and the potential destabilizing efforts of Hugo Chavez. Mr. Anderson believes that the focus on Venezuela is politically motivated rather than threat based. He believed that support from technical

intelligence assets provided adequate information to “keep their heads above water” in developing assessments. The end of military-to-military training resulted in an end to democratic influence in the military and decreased access so critical to determining leadership intentions. Other intelligence analysts agree with this assessment that the US lack of security cooperation has left a vacuum of influence in the region. This provided Venezuela and opportunity to fill a “vacuum left by a United States preoccupied with the Middle East, Chávez has bought Argentine debt and offered neighbors many times the \$1.5 billion in foreign aid the United States distributes.”⁴⁷ The third analytical priority is Ecuador and the increased FARC drug trafficking spilling over from Colombia. The priority functional threats for NGIC are narco-trafficking and insurgent activity. Without funding from narco-trafficking the FARC would be considerably weakened. The links between insurgent activity and terrorism are a growing concern. Increased insurgent activity in the Southern Cone is gaining prominence and influence. If the actions of these insurgents combined with the inevitable natural disasters (floods, mudslides, hurricanes, volcanic activity) it could result in a mass migration north across the U.S. border which could threaten U.S. national security.

Mr. Anderson does not believe there are truly “ungoverned” areas in the region and that this definition is a misnomer. He believes that NGIC is accepting the most risk in covering transnational threats but that increased GWOT funded resources will gradually improve that situation. The least risk and the most resources are aligned against the narco-trafficking arena since the defeat of the FARC is impossible without the elimination of the narco-funding. Mr. Anderson's overall assessment is that the lack of intelligence resources means that “If something happens, we will be holding an empty bag and facing another intelligence failure”⁴⁸.

Policy Recommendations to Balance Intelligence Allocation with Latin American Threats

According to the Deputy DNI for Collection, Mary Graham, “The challenge, of course, is that the resources you have in today’s world are heavily tilted at Iraq, Afghanistan, and the WOT”⁴⁹. The reality of shifting scarce resources like human intelligence collectors and technical platforms inevitably impacts intelligence collection focused on Latin America. The DNI appointed six mission managers to delineate collection priorities. Of the six mission managers, one is assigned to assess the intelligence gaps for Cuba and Venezuela. There is no mission manager focus on the remainder of Latin America but this is understandable since this is directly aligned with the priorities stated in the 2006 NSS. So what can be done to provide increased intelligence support to national security requirements for Latin American in an environment of constrained resources?

The first recommendation is to expand the exploitation of open source intelligence (OSINT). Open source information is the most accessible, least expensive tool for obtaining worldwide intelligence coverage. In a region of extremely limited intelligence collectors, the use of open sources has been relied upon for at least the last ten years. The 2005 creation of the DNI's Open Source Center (OSC) helped consolidate open source references for use by analysts throughout the Intelligence community (IC). But this vast amount of open source (OS) intelligence necessitates the need for a focused, standardized requirements system to analyze the mounds of data and synthesize the results to make it useful for analysts at all levels of operation. In addition, the OS intelligence products need to be posted on web sites at varying degrees of classification to ease access and collaboration. DoD analysts work primarily on the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) and Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) environment so OS products need to be accessible in both environments. But equally important is the posting of OS products and discussions on unclassified networks to allow the widest dissemination and sharing between governmental, allies, and scholarly analysts. Open source intelligence is a valuable, low cost intelligence discipline. The easier the IC makes access to OS the more we can exploit the vast quantities of information and produce intelligence to support national policymakers. The OSC's Open Source Academy courses need to be publicized throughout the IC.

There is a real need for all-source intelligence analysts who possess foreign language skills. Therefore, the second recommendation is to require target country language training for selected all-source intelligence analysts in the IC. An all-source analyst with target country language skills can directly access original documents not previously translated or interpreted. An analyst's direct access to target language professional journals, newspapers, academic and political publications and military communications allows first level analysis free from previous editing or organizational bias (State INR vs. DIA vs. NGIC). The necessary language skills must be defined in the analyst's job descriptions. In order to be effective, the level of language proficiency must be a minimum of 2/2 on the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) or agency equivalent. The all-source analyst's language proficiency should focus on reading skills rather than speaking skills and must be coupled with target country cultural and environmental training. To gain maximum benefit, the IC must program assignment stability for all-source analysts to increase their target country knowledge base and experience. Due to the current lack of personnel with target language skills, the IC should employ more foreign born all-source intelligence analysts to conduct unclassified or collateral analysis. The current security requirements for these personnel need to be reevaluated and balanced with the unique skills

they possess. The true value of foreign born analysts is their innate cultural awareness and linguistic abilities; these skills cannot be attained without extensive academic training and in-country exposure.

The third recommendation tackles the difficult issue of increased collaboration between the national intelligence agencies, academia, and other sources of analysis. DNI Chief of Analysis Thomas Fingar states “The intelligence community can’t stay closed and do its job...The increased risk of inadvertent disclosure when we share intelligence with a wider audience exists but is balanced by the access and infusion of different viewpoints”⁵⁰.

Department of State INR has earned the reputation as the standard-setter for collaboration with academia and other national agencies. They credit their success in accurate analysis on its openness. In 2005, the INR held 280 conferences and seminars with outside experts. The other intelligence agencies need to increase their analytical interaction with academia through the use of conferences, research projects, guest lecturers, and collaborative courses. These collaboration venues need to be conducted at various levels of classification to allow the necessary participation. The Internet provides a valuable and accessible venue to advertise these collaborative opportunities throughout the IC, academia, and business environments. Another area that needs increased collaboration is between law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The creation of the National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC) is making great strides in this area. The NCTC was established in August 2004 to:

serve as the primary organization in the United States Government (USG) for integrating and analyzing all intelligence pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism (CT) and to conduct strategic operational planning by integrating all instruments of national power⁵¹.

To benefit intelligence coverage of Latin America, the collaboration must also encompass intelligence requirements beyond those associated with terrorism

The final recommendation to ensure adequate intelligence focus is to increase the Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) effort throughout Latin America. This undervalued, under-emphasized instrument is a low cost option that potentially reaps a high payoff. The benefits of security cooperation can reduce suspicion between governments, increase confidence among the military and law enforcement, shape the populace’s positive perceptions of the military or law enforcement, and promote democratic standards and practices. Theater Security Cooperation, specifically military to military training and intelligence sharing agreements provide unique access and build essential bonds between foreign military officers, intelligence agencies, and law enforcement.

In July 2003, eight Latin American countries lost the U.S. security assistance that provides military-to-military training because they refused to sign immunity agreements that shield U.S. citizens from prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC). These immunity agreements are called “Article 98” agreements and are named after the section of the 2002 Rome Statute of the ICC that established the court. The American Service-Members Protection Act (Title II of the 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act, P.L. 107-206) suspends U.S. foreign military training, financing, and transfers of surplus defense articles to ICC member countries that have not signed an Article 98 agreement. Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela refused to sign waivers for Article 98. The Bush Administration and Congress “agreed to use security assistance as a bargaining chip to get foreign governments to sign an agreement exempting U.S. servicemen from prosecution under the controversial new International Criminal Court”⁵². As a result, military relationships were not nurtured by the U.S. and for three years we lost the collection and collaboration capability the once-close relationships provided. In October 2006, President Bush signed a national interest waiver that reinstated International Military Education and Training (IMET) for all the Latin American countries listed above, with the exception of Venezuela.⁵³ The national interest waivers are approved for a two year period.

In addition to the Article 98 waiver challenges, there is a reluctance to conduct intelligence training with Latin American militaries. Historically, Latin American governments have failed to delineate between internal and external threats. In response to internal threats, many Latin American governments employed their military intelligence resources against its citizens. The current Latin American governments maintain a lingering mistrust of their intelligence organizations. Any U.S. intelligence training in Latin America must include intelligence oversight training for both the legislature and military. Intelligence training should emphasize transparency for funding, priorities, and authority. Security cooperation programs, which include intelligence training, with Latin American countries can support U.S. security by strengthening a country's ability to reduce weapons proliferation, transnational threats or terrorist support or activity. In addition, when we train foreign intelligence analysts we also gain the benefit of their analytical insights and products. The low cost, long term investment in theater security cooperation would require U.S. policymakers to look beyond the immediate national security focus in the Middle East and realize these long term benefits in Latin America.

Conclusion

The research conducted for this project indicates that a minimum, but adequate, amount of intelligence is provided to national decision and policy makers to support current Latin American national security requirements. There is enough intelligence focus on Latin America for what is currently required and is sufficient and suitable for our Nation's needs. Given the projected political and military focus in the Middle East, it is not likely that Latin America will receive a higher priority for intelligence resources unless a crisis occurs. If a crisis occurs, most of the IC regional analysts interviewed for this report agree that they will be unable to surge reliable HUMINT assets and will rely extensively on open source information, limited technical resources and local government sources. An additional risk with minimal, but adequate, intelligence coverage is our inability to monitor threats to fragile democracies, support to extremist groups, and increased insurgent activity in this vital region. Potentially, this well known lack of national intelligence focus could embolden anti-American leaders and non-democratic movements to reduce democratic strides made throughout the region.

Discussions with current intelligence professionals indicate that intelligence support for Latin America is "adequate", but the United States' Intelligence Community could improve their coverage without reallocating scarce intelligence resources. The key to providing improved national intelligence support to Latin America is to increase efficiencies in the use of open source intelligence, increase collaboration between the IC, government agencies and academia, increase the use of foreign born analysts and approve judicious use of the Article 98 waiver. These four initiatives support the U.S. environment of security and help to project the promotion of our democratic values.

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